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Abstract—In this paper we present a new kind of Denial-of-
Service attack against the PHY layer of low power wireless sensor
networks. Overcoming the very limited range of jamming-based
attacks, this attack can penetrate deep into a target network
with high power efficiency. We term this the Droplet attack, as
it attains enormous disruption by dropping small, payload-less
frame headers to its victim’s radio receiver, depriving the latter of
bandwidth and sleep time. We demonstrate the Droplet attack’s
high damage rate to full duty-cycle receivers, and further show
that a high frequency version of Droplet can even force nodes
running on very low duty-cycle MAC protocols to drop most of
their packets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks are known to be vulnerable to
jamming, a form of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack that works
by sending an interference signal to cause bit errors at the
target node’s PHY layer [1]. An implicit assumption about
the high effectiveness of jamming is that a single jammer can
put multiple sensor nodes within its transmission range out of
service, implying that a small number of jammers are sufficient
to disrupt an entire network consisting of many densely located
nodes, causing a disproportional level of damage [2].
On the other hand, for most commercial and industrial
WSN applications, any jamming attacker tends to be always
limited to a certain level of transmission power, and might
have limited battery capacity as well, thus leaving room for
the target network to embrace power-efficient anti-jamming
techniques to mitigate the damage. Researchers have focused
on finding defense mechanisms for a single physical link,
which can be evaluated by a set of metrics about the relative
costs of the attacker and the pair of defenders [3]. The essential
strategy of such anti-jamming techniques is bolstering nodes
with extra data redundancy and incorporating more protocol
intelligence while still keeping the average radio duty-cycle
sufficiently low, in order to contain and outlast a potential
jammer. This can trigger an arms race, as the attacker seeks
to adjust its own radio duty cycle to gain relative advantage
over its target, which in turn justifies an increase in the defense
budget of the defending network [4].
The motivation for a high defense level against jamming
is based on the aforementioned assumption that the damage
level is multiplied when a single jammer affects a large area of
densely deployed nodes. This assumption is, however, invalid
in most practical scenarios. First, an intrusive, high power radio
transmitter is hard to escape detection if it is planted in the
central area of a network, e.g., inside a household or a factory.
Another reason is that even a subverted node located in the
heart of the deployment area tends to have a very limited
effective jamming range, much smaller and fragmented than
its transmission range. A jammer converted from a low power
sensor node, such as one based on a 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4
radio transceiver, can block a bidirectional link only when it
is carefully placed between the communicating pair. Its effect
on nodes further away usually amounts to a harmless rise in
the noise floor.
Is it possible to launch a PHY layer DoS attack from a low
power sensor radio at the peripheral of a network, which can
disrupt the entire area within the radio’s transmission range?
In pursuit of an answer, we discover a common vul-
nerability at a sensor node’s radio receiver, whose built-in
synchronization mechanism is easy to trigger using fake data
frames. We construct a malicious attacker using a sensor
node, who generates a short data frame to trick the targeted
node’s receiver into starting header synchronization and frame
decoding. Furthermore, the receiver hardware’s incapability
to distinguish an authentic PHY payload size header from a
forged one allows our attacker to use an empty payload to pro-
long the receiver’s decoding process to a full-size frame length
period, until the empty frame is eventually dropped due to a
CRC error. Meanwhile legitimate data frames destined to the
victim are dropped, and the attacker spends a large proportion
of its time resting its radio in sleep mode, conserving energy
for the next attack. Because the synchronization header is a
shared PHY layer parameter across a network, a single attack
frame can affect all nodes in idle listening mode within the
attacker’s transmission range, equivalent to an extended-range
jam burst. Repeated transmission of such short attack frames
are analogous to sporadic rain droplets falling on a house roof
that deprives an inhabitant of sleep. We therefore call this
new type of DoS attack the Droplet attack. Because Droplet
attacks target the radio’s idle listening mode rather than the
active receiving mode, it disrupts communication without the
need for high transmission power, unlike a jammer who must
roar like a thunder storm in order to overwhelm the victim’s
received signal power. Furthermore, Droplet attacks cannot be
mitigated by increasing node density in the target network.
A Droplet attack can strike a heavy blow to nodes operating
in full duty-cycles, such as a high traffic gateway node or
a normal sensor node scanning for neighbor announcements
or time synchronization beacons. Intermittent transmissions of
the Droplet frames at a frequency of 225 Hz are sufficient to
reduce the available bandwidth of such a node by over 90%.
Once a node enters a low duty-cycle mode, e.g., periodic on-
off cycles, however, it has a good chance to avoid the attack
because it wakes up often during the relatively long interval
between two intermittent Droplet frames. To increase Droplet
attack’s hit rate of such short wake-up periods, we boost the
attack frequency to over 5000 Hz by packing more than 40
attack frames into a single full size frame and then transmitting
it in a tight sequence, using a special cyclic transmission mode
of the radio. The result is a dense falling of droplets, a.k.a the
Drizzle attack, that forms a “rain curtain” too thick for most
legitimate frames to get through. We show that the Drizzle
attack is still more efficient than jamming because of its large
range advantage.
Our contributions are the following. We construct both our
attackers and target applications on a 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4
radio. We show an ultra low power Droplet attacker operating
at 5% radio duty cycle can incur 93% packet errors to full-duty
cycle receivers. In contrast, it takes a continuous jammer over
100 times higher transmission power to attain a similar effect.
We also evaluate the Droplet and Drizzle attacks against the
highly robust, low-duty cycle ContikiMAC. While Droplet’s
damage effect is reduced to 10%, Drizzle can cause 90%
packet errors.
This paper continues with an overview of related work in
Section II. We resume our discussion about jamming’s range
limits in Section III, which leads to the design principles and
implementation of Droplet and Drizzle attacks in Section IV
and Section V. The effect of these attacks is summarized in
Section VI. We draw our conclusions in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A taxonomy of DoS attacks in WSNs by Wood and
Stankovic identifies 12 generic types of attacks across the PHY,
datalink and network layers [5]. Three of those DoS attacks,
namely Flooding, Collisions and Jamming are related to our
work. Droplet attack’s principle is conceptually similar to a
TCP SYN flood [6], which forges intermittent light-weight
communication requests that consume a disproportionally large
amount of target resources. A TCP SYN flood causes DoS by
the depletion of the memory pool holding particular protocol
data structures; Droplet causes DoS by depletion of available
channel bandwidth. In additional to bandwidth consumption,
Droplet also exhausts the target’s stored energy, mainly by
deprivation of the target radio’s sleep cycles. In contrast, a
jammed victim normally displays an increase of active time,
spent on excessive link and network layer retransmissions.
Therefore jamming and Droplet are two PHY layer attacks
of rather contrasting nature. Jamming works by “robbing” the
receiver of signal quality, whereas Droplet works by “stealing”
the receiver’s bandwidth when there is no signal.
A survey from 2009 covers many WSN jamming tech-
niques [1]. Our work is most related to those based on low
power, duty cycled radios. Law et al.’s statistical jammer
collects temporal patterns of the target’s communication, which
is dominated by MAC parameters, and then schedules bursty
jams to collide with the target’s transmissions [3]. Their
invention of three jammer performance metrics, i.e. Censorship
rate (percentage of message blocked), Attrition rate (percent-
age of extra energy cost) and Lifetime advantage have been
adopted by others. We believe this metric set is incomplete
without consideration of the effective jamming range, which
determines the multiplier of a single jammer’s damage effect
to surrounding nodes. A small change in this range may tip the
delicate power balance between a small number of attackers
and the collective effort of many defenders.
Wood et al.’s DEEJAM studies four increasingly sophisti-
cated jamming patterns using normal IEEE 802.15.4 radios [4].
They are the first to use empty-payload PHY headers to launch
jam bursts. Inspired by their work, we further investigate the
effect of header synchronizations in the process, and show that
this effect can reach a range much larger than the interference
effect of the headers.
Channel hopping, e.g., Wispernet [7] and packet frag-
mentation, e.g., DEEJAM and Jam-Buster [8] are among the
most common techniques proposed for jamming mitigation.
These proactive counter-measures all incur computation and
communication overheads, which can be justified only in cases
where the assumption about a large jamming range holds
true. We are going to re-examine this assumption in the next
section.
III. RANGE LIMITATIONS OF JAMMING
In the section we analyze two main factors that limit the
effective range of jamming, namely near-far effect and hidden
transmitter effect. This prompts us to look for an alternative
attack that is unconstrained by such factors.
A. The 1-to-N Jamming Attack Model
Early studies of WSN jamming attacks assume that a
malicious radio transmitter emitting high power, wide-band
interferences is highly destructive to sensor nodes connected by
low power links [2] [9]. Superior transmission power enables a
single jammer to disrupt N surrounding nodes concurrently, the
closer nodes suffering more severe disruptions. This intuitive
1-to-N attack model forms the theoretical basis for mitigative
route-around measures, which leverage the redundant routing
resources of a dense WSN to maintain network connectiv-
ity [10]. Researchers later shift their interest to defenses against
jamming launched from common low power radio hardware,
and implicitly inherit the same attack model, assuming a large
ratio between the number of affected nodes and the jammer.
They focus much on the economics of the war between two
opposing sides, with the attacker rationing its transmission
duty cycles to conserve limited energy capacity and the
many defenders spending extra computation and bandwidth
resources to bolster link robustness. Duty-cycled jammers
include fixed duty-cycle burst transmitters such as DEEJAM’s
pulse jamming as well as MAC protocol-aware, speculative
packet colliders such as Law et al.’s statistical jammers against
S-MAC, LMAC and B-MAC [3] [11]. A relatively high unit
cost for link strengthening is justified, based on the reasoning
that the attacker is affecting many links in its range at the
same time, thus posing a grave threat to rudimentary network
services, such as route maintenance and time synchronization,
in additional to lowering data throughput.
Counter-intuitively, a dense network with many nodes
deployed at close ranges within each other tends to be more
robust against jamming than a sparse network. This is because
of the near-far effect, which dictates that a transmitter can
capture a receiver at close range at presence of an interference
from another concurrent transmitter afar [12]. Therefore, even
if an attacker constructed by low power radios might be
able to eavesdrop and inject messages from and to its many
targets, it has very limited jam capability to cause extensive
communication disruptions. We have been able to verify the
near-far effect in a simple scenario consisting of three Zolertia
Z1 nodes [13]. Under the attack of a continuous jammer [14]
located only three meters away, the receiver switches into
and out of the jamming range as another close-by transmitter
adjusts its transmission power relative to the jammer. Attempts
to jam a commercial or industrial WSN are likely to face
obstacles just to first place a jammer close enough to the
deployment, let alone to penetrate its signal from the edge
of the network into the central area.
B. Packet Errors Caused by Constant Jamming
We want to understand packet errors caused by different
levels of constant jamming. In order to minimize the effect
of random interferences from coexistent radio transmitters,
We carefully set up an isolated shared channel among the
CC2420 radios [15] of three Z1 nodes. They are connected
by SMA coaxial cables and passive components, which form
an isolated propagation path. The transmitter and jammer’s
attenuated RF signals are superimposed by a 2-to-1 RF power
combiner, before being divided by a 1-to-2 RF power splitter
into two equal halves, each feeding into the receiver and
a spectrum analyzer respectively [16]. We use the spectrum
analyzer to calibrate the measured received signal strength
(RSS), since the on-chip RSSI register readings are known to
be inaccurate [17]. Our set-up shields the radios from a large
proportion of external interferences, as illustrated in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1: Hardware set-up for packet error rate measurements.
We set the transmitter’s power at a certain constant level,
and adjust the jammer’s power level to create different signal-
to-interference-and-noise ratios (SINR) in range [-2 dB, +23
dB]. We then observe the packet error rate (PER) over 10,000
transmitted raw 802.15.4 PHY frames. We use a 20-byte frame
length, as specified by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for PER
tests [18]. We generate two different jam waveforms, the
unmodulated carrier and the modulated carrier, available as
CC2420 TX test modes [14]. We show in Figure 2 the relation
between the lower-portion of signal-to-interference-and-noise
ratios (SINR) and respective PERs, the RSS being at -62 dBm.
Continuous jamming attains 100% blocking at low SINRs, but
packet errors decrease steeply from 100% down to close to
0% as soon as the SINR exceeds a certain threshold. For
the modulated carrier, we observe a 3 dB threshold, which
conforms perfectly to the CC2420 radio’s nominal co-channel
rejection ratio. We repeat the same test on three different RSS
levels, emulating weak, intermediate and strong links, and
the results are consistent. We can conclude that a jammer’s
effective range depends heavily on the interference power
picked up by a specific receiver relative to the signal strength
of another transmitter. In a dense network, a jammer’s range
therefore tends to be constrained and fragmented by the strong
links formed between close neighbor nodes.
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Fig. 2: SINR vs. PER under jamming. Jamming can block a
link completely, but quickly loses effect when overpowered by
a rival transmitter’s signal.
C. Further Range limitations by Reactive jammers
Reactive jammers rely on detection of preamble or frame
header to trigger jam transmission, such as DEEJAM’s activity
jammer and interrupt jammer [4]. They can be highly power-
efficient compared with constant jamming, Its range is however
further constrained by the hidden transmitter effect [12]. In
such a scenario, a reactive jammer is close enough to the re-
ceiver, but still fails to interfere an incoming packet originated
from a sender outside its sensitive range (Figure 3). Our hard-
ware set-up enables us to hide the transmitter completely from
the jammer by adding sufficient attenuation between them. We
have been able to verify that the reactive packet jammer has
a smaller range than a continuous jammer, by repeating an
experiment in Section V of our previous work [19].
Fig. 3: A reactive jammer fails to interfere the signal sent to
a close-by receiver from a remote, hidden transmitter.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF DROPLET ATTACK
A truly efficient DoS attacker based on low power radios
must overcome the range disadvantage compared with its
targets. Utilizing its radio transmitter’s full link budget would
enable an attacker to launch disruptive attacks from a remote
distance. We describe how broadcasting empty-payload frame
headers allows us to disrupt strong links from a long range.
We term this method Droplet attack, because of the small size
of the headers and the low power level required for radio
transmission.
A. Mysterious packet losses outside the jamming range
The PER measurements shown in the previous section
highlights the range limitations of the two CC2420-based
jamming methods. Because the modulated carrier mode has
a slight range advantage over the unmodulated carrier mode,
it has been used to create artificial background noise levels [20]
and packet loss patterns [19] for experimental purposes. Our
PER measurements with the presence of the modulated carrier
interference reveal an intriguing phenomenon. When the SINR
exceeds the 3 dB co-channel rejection level, i.e., the receiver
is outside of the jammer’s range, there continues to be a
2.5% PER, as shown in Figure 4. In an open air experiment,
this small fraction of packet losses across the high SINR
range would have been easily mistaken ed as losses caused
by collisions with other coexisting channel activities. Since
we have excluded most of the external interferences while
obtaining the measurements, however, we need to find out the
true reason for such packet losses.
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Fig. 4: Residual packet losses under modulated carrier mode.
B. Droplet attack
It turns out that these packet losses are caused by a different
source than the continuous presence of a jamming signal. The
64 kb pseudo random data used to modulate the carrier happens
to embed a few IEEE 802.15.4 synchronization headers. The
latter is a constant bit sequence that precedes every frame. It
contains a few zero preamble bytes followed by an 8-bit start-
of-frame (SFD) header, which together synchronize a radio
receiver to the transmitter. Detection of the synchronization
header automatically starts decoding of subsequent data. To
enable correct termination of frame decoding, a frame length
field is often included at the beginning of the frame. IEEE
802.15.4 defines its PHY header to be such an 8-bit length
field, so that a compliant receiver can use this information
to buffer up a whole frame for later upper layer processing.
The synchronization headers embedded inside the random data
sent by a remote jammer can therefore accidentally trigger
a receiver’s synchronization and frame buffering mechanism,
making it temporarily deaf to other concurrent transmitters.
Only after the buffered frame with junk data is dropped, due
to an CRC error, does the receiver become available again
for reception. This explains why the random data jammer
keeps incurring a small percentage of packet losses to the
receiver, even when its signal drops to 25 dB lower than a
rival transmitter.
We can design a malicious transmitter that exploits this vul-
nerability to disrupt communication around its neighborhood.
By emitting a small, bogus frame that terminates immediately
after a length field indicating a maximum frame size, such an
attacker can trick a listening receiver into a lengthy but futile
frame decoding process, disabling it from receiving from other
nodes while it is trying to decode a shadow payload ensuing
the length field from random noise. For IEEE 802.15.4 radios,
decoding a maximum-size, 127-byte frame wipes more than
4ms off the receiver’s available channel time. By contrast,
the attacker only needs to transmit a 6-byte frame header to
cause the damage, using only 5% of active radio duty-cycles
of its victim, while spending the rest of its own time in a
low power sleep mode. Frequent transmissions of such headers
can cause denial-of-service to nodes within the attacker’s full
transmission range. We term this attack the Droplet attack,
because the small headers are analogous to intermittent rain
droplets falling on a roof that creates a resounding disturbance
through a room. We illustrate the mechanism of Droplet attacks
in Figure 5, and shows the actual time scale of events triggered
by a Droplet attack in Figure 6 from a signal trace captured
from a logic analyzer [21].
Normally, further software processing is needed for the host
MCU to read out the junk payload from the radio’s hardware
buffer and to eventually drop the frame upon detecting a CRC
error. In this work, we do not try to quantify the extra software
processing latency incurred by the Droplet attack, because it
is dependent on the implementation of the radio driver and the
speed of the communication bus between the MCU and radio.
Instead we focus on measuring a victim node’s radio receiver’s
deprived bandwidth and sleep time. Based on the maximum
throughput of 250 kbps of a IEEE 802.15.4 radio, there are
approximately 238 full length frame periods per second. By
transmitting Droplet frames at a frequency close to 238 Hz, an
attacker can repeatedly force a full-duty cycle radio receiver
into receiving mode, thus depriving it of most of its available
bandwidth. When the attacker’s transmission range covers a
large number of nodes densely deployed in its surrounding
area, the damage is multiplied.
C. High Frequency Droplet Attack: Drizzle
The scenario becomes very different for networks running
on a low duty-cycle MAC protocol. In such networks, nodes
only wake up for a short period every long cycle to detect
communication requests and exchange data. The wake-up
period is usually set to a minimal length necessary for detecting
a communication request. An attacker unsynchronized with its
target’s duty-cycling schedule thus hits the latter’s short wake-
up windows with only low probability. Even if a Droplet frame
occasionally falls into such a wake-up period, it might still fail
to lock up the receiver at the presence of competition from a
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Fig. 5: The Droplet attack. The receiver picks up the attacker’s 5-byte synchronization header first; after decoding the frame
length, it starts decoding 127 more bytes, the maximum PSDU size mandated by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Meanwhile a
concurrent sender’s legitimate packet is ignored.
Fig. 6: Time traces of three interrupt signals during two Droplet attacks: 1. The attacker’s SFD pin goes active during transmission
of a Droplet header; 2. The victim’s SFD pin goes active during its reception of the frame. 3. The victim’s FIFOP pin goes
active when frame buffering starts and goes down when the host MCU starts reading the frame out of the hardware buffer. The
widths of the pulses indicate an event’s time duration.
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Fig. 7: The Drizzle attack against ContikiMAC. A small gap exists between two consecutive MAC probe frames that are used
to synchronize with the receiver. When the receiver wakes up to detect an upcoming probe, it has a high probability to detect
instead one of the Droplet headers embedded in the chain of almost continuous Drizzle frames, and thus fails to synchronize
with the sender.
concurrent sender. For example, a sender running XMAC [22]
or ContikiMAC [23] transmits a repeated frame sequence to
ensure high detection rate by the intended receiver during
its wake-up period. The tight intervals between these hand-
shaking frames leave only very small gaps for any attack
frames to sneak in and alter the protocol state.
In order to bolster the attack probability on low duty-cycle
networks, we can increase the Droplet attack’s transmission
frequency. A minimum inter-frame interval required by the
radio hardware however imposes an upper limit on how often
the Droplet attack can be launched.
To eliminate the inter-frame interval, we can pack a succes-
sion of Droplet headers together into a single long frame. The
droplet headers can be shorted to just three bytes by keeping
only one of the four preamble bytes, therefore a 127-byte
frame may contain up to 43 Droplet headers. Using CC2420’s
cyclic FIFO transmission mode, we can transmit this frame
repeatedly in an almost seamless manner, plugging inter-frame
time gaps needed for buffer refill. We thus can achieve a
transmission rate beyond 5000 frames/sec for Droplet frames.
This essentially turns the periodic droplets into a full duty-
cycle “drizzle”, whose temporal density helps it prevail in the
contention for a receiver’s first attention after waking up.
We illustrate the Drizzle attack in Figure 7. It transmits
frames at a rate close to the maximum channel throughput, thus
creates a similar interference effect as a continuous jammer to
close-by nodes. Its real strength though, is reaching nodes far
out in its transmission range, disrupting links otherwise are
robust against jamming.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we discuss some important details of the
implementation of the Droplet and Drizzle attacks using a
CC2420 radio-based sensor node.
A. The Droplet Attack
We implement our Droplet attacker by customizing the
CC2420 radio driver of Contiki 2.6. We first attempt to use
the serial TX mode in CC2420 in order to have full control
of the content of our Droplet frame at the bit level. Attaining
this level of fine control, however, requires the implementation
of an interrupt service routine with a latency smaller than the
4 µs bit interval. Despite doubling the default clock frequency
of the Z1’s MSP430 MCU to 16 MHz, we find it difficult
to guarantee a precise ISR latency to cope with the bit-rate
interrupt signal from CC2420. This sometimes prevents us
from sending a maximum frame length equaling 127 bytes,
which leads to less bandwidth reduction to the target receiver.
We revert to the normal buffered TX mode, by writing
the length byte into the TX FIFO and issuing a transmission
command strobe to start the transmission of a Droplet frame.
When the CC2420 detects that the length byte is not followed
by any payload, a FIFO underflow occurs, terminating the
transmission automatically and putting the radio back to sleep
mode. After each transmission, we need to issue a command
strobe to flush the TX FIFO in order to clear the FIFO
underflow state. A further catch is that the TX termination
switches off the power amplifier (PA) prematurely by a half
byte period, corrupting the Droplet frame’s crucial length
header. In order to ensure the transmission of the full Droplet
frame, we therefore append it with an extra bogus byte to
prolong the termination of the radio’s PA.
Using Contiki’s high resolution r(ealtime)timer, we are
able to regulate the transmission intervals between every
two Droplet frames at a precision of 30 µs. A transmission
frequency of 225 Hz has proved to be sufficient to severely
cripple a full-duty cycle receiver.
B. The Drizzle Attack
The major bottleneck in our frequent Droplet attacks
is the time needed by the radio hardware to prepare each
transmission. Switching on the radio from sleep mode takes
at least 128 µs. In order to plug the time gaps between
consecutive Droplet frames for launching a seamless Drizzle
attack, we leverage the CC2420’s cyclic FIFO TX mode. This
mode allows the user to fill the 128-byte TX FIFO with his
own data; then the radio transmits the same data repeatedly
disregarding TX FIFO underflows. The automatic repetition of
transmissions of this mode suits our purpose perfectly, enabling
us to generate a very high density of Droplet frames in time.
We can encapsulate up to 43 Droplet frames, each only 3-
byte long (one preamble byte, one SFD byte and one frame
length byte), inside a single Drizzle frame. Each Droplet frame
is thus spaced at just 96 µs in time, much smaller than the
smallest probe intervals of X-MAC (4ms) and ContikiMAC
(500 µs). This implies that a receiver that has just woken up
from its sleep cycle has a large probability to encounter a
Droplet header first, which forces it to drop the subsequent
MAC probes from the transmitter.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate the Droplet attack’s effectiveness against a
full-duty cycle receiver, whose strong link to a transmitter
is disrupted by weak Droplet frames. We further launch the
Drizzle attack against the low-duty cycle ContikiMAC, whose
resilience against sporadic Droplet attacks yields under the
pressure of its high frequency alternative.
A. Measurement set-up
We use the same hardware set-up as the previous jamming
resistance measurements, replacing the jammer node with a
Droplet attacker. In order to attain an accurate evaluation
of the Droplet effect, we want to control unwanted packet
losses caused by occasional collisions between Droplet frames
and data frames sent by the transmitter. We carefully set the
attacker’s transmission power to just -25 dBm, resulting in -85
dBm RSS at the receiver, a level just high enough for the latter
to drop less than 1% of Droplet frames.
B. Attacking a full-duty cycle receiver
A full-duty cycle receiver, e.g., the gateway node of a
large network or a normal sensor node scanning for neigh-
bor announcements or time synchronization beacons, is very
vulnerable to Droplet attacks, because they spend a lot of time
in idle listening mode. The attacker emits Droplet frames at a
high frequency so that their shadow payloads forms a heavy
burden on the victim’s radio receiver.
We set our attacker to transmit Droplet frames at an aver-
age frequency of 225 Hz, each frame transmission separated
by the average interval plus/minus a small time jitter. The
transmitter’s transmission power is adjusted from -25 dBm up
to 0 dBm to generate different SINRs. At each SINR level,
we conduct a PER measurement for 1000 transmitted 20-byte
frames consisting of random payload data. In addition to the
PER, we also measure the average Correlation Errors (CE)
of correctly received frames in order to reveal the level of
signal degradation. We obtain each received frame’s CE value
by deducting its LQI value from 108, the maximum LQI level
we have ever observed from a CC2420 receiver.
We plot the result of the 225 Hz Droplet attacker together
with data collected from the previous jamming measurements
in Figure 8. A jammer fails as soon as its signal fades a few
dBs below its rival. By contrast, Droplet’s effect is independent
of SINR, as indicated by the flat PER across the 25 dB range.
The effective range of Droplet thus is the same as the radio’s
transmission range, which reaches a few tens meters indoors
to a few hundred meters outdoors for IEEE 802.15.4. The
graph also shows that, at the boundaries of the jammers’
effective range where PER falls between 20% and 80%, many
packets still get through despite a notable degree of signal
quality degradation, as indicated by the correlation errors.
This is because the radio receiver’s built-in error recovery
mechanism can tolerate a certain level of signal degradation.
By contrast, the Droplet attack results close-to-zero correlation
errors, because its short frames seldom waste energy colliding
with those of its rivals.
An attacker located at the peripheral of a network can
potentially penetrate deep into its targeted area, and only starts
to fade as its signal drops below the receiver sensitivity (-95
dBm for CC2420). When transmitting at 225 Hz, a Droplet
attacker causes a high 93.5% PER to all full-duty cycle nodes
within its range, disrupting normal network operations.
Improved radio sensitivity (e.g. Atmel AT86RF230
transceiver [24] or TI CC2591 external low noise ampli-
fier [25]) normally does not alter a node’s anti-jamming
capability, because both signal and interference are amplified
by the same amount on such a receiver. But such a measure
would exacerbate the damage caused by Droplet attacks, as
better sensitivity results in a larger transmission range of the
attacker.
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Fig. 8: Droplet attack’s range advantage over jamming. At low
SINRs, Droplet destructs a small amount of data frames by
collisions just as jamming does. While jamming loses effect
once SINR exceeds the 3 dB threshold, Droplet continues to
cause a 93.5% damage rate.
In the next experiment, we set the transmitter’s power at
a constant level, resulting in a SINR of 22.6 dB, equivalent
to a power ratio of 180 times between the transmitter and the
attacker. We adjust the attacker’s frequency in 25 Hz steps
between 25 Hz to 225 Hz. For each attack frequency, we
measure the average PER obtained over 5 repeated sequential
transmissions of 1000 frames, using both 5-byte and 125
byte frame payloads. Figure 9 shows the relation between the
droplet frequency and the resultant packet error rates. We see
an almost linear relation between the attack frequency and
packet errors, which is a very desirable property of an energy
constrained attacker, who might want to regulate its attack rate
to cause just enough disruptions without spending too much
energy. We also see that Droplet attacks are equally effective
against small and large frame sizes. By contrast, jamming
tends to work against long frames more effectively than short
frames, because long frames have a higher probability of being
corrupted by an interference signal.
C. Droplet and Drizzle attacks on ContikiMAC
ContikiMAC is a sender-initiated, low-duty cycle MAC
protocol. A node running ContikiMAC wakes up periodically
from low power sleeping in order to check for channel activity,
and accepts incoming data if it detects a packet from a sender.
In a unicast, the sender transmits the data packet repeatedly
until its intended receiver wakes up, detects the packet, and
sends back an acknowledgment. The detail operations of the
protocol can be found in its technical report [23]. Because
a ContikiMAC node’s wake-up period contains two consec-
utive clear-channel assessment (CCA) checks, each lasting a
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Fig. 9: A Droplet attacker can assert precise control over PER
by adjusting its frequency. Both small and large data frames
are attacked with the same effect.
mere 192 µs, it can keep a very low duty-cycle under a low
throughput setting. This leaves only small chances for Droplet
attacks to hit those short CCA check periods of a waken node
and occupy its radio. We therefore try to increase the hit rate
by attack the ContikiMAC using the high frequency Drizzle
attacks.
We set up a pair of sender and receiver, both running
on ContikiMAC with a wake-up frequency of 16 Hz. This
is equivalent to about 6ms awake time per second. The
sender transmits a unicast packet to the receiver on an average
frequency of 4 Hz. We disable higher layer retransmissions in
order to avoid excessive data delivery delays and to simplify
our PER analysis. We reuse our previous hardware set-up, but
remove the spectrum analyzer in order to reduce asymmetry
of the bidirectional path between the transmitter and receiver
(Figure 10).
RX
TX
Drizzle
−46 dB
−46 dB
Fig. 10: Hardware set-up for Drizzle attacks against a pair of
nodes running on ContikiMAC.
We program the sender to send four different sizes of
packets in successive runs, ranging from the smallest size
supported by ContikiMAC to 120-byte packets. In each run,
we transmit 2500 packets in five batches, resetting the receiver
between each batch to randomize the relative phase offset
between the transmitter and the receiver. We set our Drizzle
attacker’s radio TX power to the lowest possible level, which
is 22 dB weaker than the sender’s. To verify that the almost
seamless transmissions of Drizzle frames do not interfere the
receiver at this low power level, we try to transmit the Drizzle
frames using instead reverse-phase modulation 1, and confirm
that the receiver gets 100% of the data packets at presence of
such a low power noise spectrum. On the other hand, the large
attenuation between the sender and the attacker ensures that
1By setting CC2420’s MDMCTRL1 register’s modulation mode bit
the former is hidden from the latter. Therefore, the sender’s
data packet transmissions are not throttled by the attacker’s
signal power. We repeat the measurements using a Droplet
attacker with 225 Hz attack rate to provide a comparison with
the Drizzle attacker. Figure 11 shows the results of of our
attacks on ContikiMAC-based unicasts. While Droplet attacks
can only cause about 10% packet losses, Drizzle achieves an
average 90% PER with high probability. We can imagine that
at such a high PER, all normal network services are essentially
disabled.
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Fig. 11: Comparison of Droplet and Drizzle’s attack effects to
ContikiMAC. Drizzle achieves an average 90% PER, sufficient
to break the strong link between the transmitter and the
receiver.
We want to note that, under more general conditions, the
sender has a large likelihood to also fall under the range of
the Drizzle attacker, together with its intended receiver. In that
case, packet losses are further aggravated when the sender’s
ability to perform carrier sensing and receive acknowledgments
are hampered.
D. Defenses against Droplet and Drizzle attacks
A few techniques can be employed to mitigate Droplet
and Drizzle attacks. First, hardware assisted address header
decoding can be enabled to filter out frames decoded with a
mismatching destination address to the local address. But the
radio receiver usually still has to wait until the indicated frame
length duration has elapsed, because the frame can actually
be a valid one destined to another node 2. Therefore this
mechanism can only reduce some software processing from
the host processor, but cannot recover receiver bandwidth lost
due to a Droplet frame.
Channel switching can avoid a single-channel attacker.
Nevertheless, because the number of available channels is
limited, a group of attackers can co-ordinate to occupy each
of the channels respectively.
Using a customized SFD among the protected network, as
DEEJAM’s frame masking method has shown, is an effective
counter-measure against Droplet attacks. Such a custom SFD
is hardly a well kept secret, however, because the number of
possible bit-sequences for a good SFD is very small. Further-
more, using custom SFDs hinders inter-operation of devices
2”If a frame is rejected, CC2420 will only start searching for a new frame
after the rejected frame has been completely received (as defined by the length
field) to avoid detecting false SFDs within the frame.” –CC2420 datasheet
from different vendors; most commercial radio chips support
only the standard SFD. The same problem applies to other
non-standard techniques, such as changing the modulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have re-examined the common jamming attack model
for low power wireless sensor networks. Jamming attacks
have significant range limitations, which make them infeasible
in most realistic scenarios. We propose instead the Droplet
attack, which is based on common low power sensor radios,
but can launch effective DoS attacks to all nodes within its
transmission range. We have demonstrated its effectiveness
against full duty-cycle receivers, marked by a 93.5% packet
error rate. Based on the Droplet attack’s principle, we further
design a high frequency alternative, the Drizzle attack. We
show that Drizzle attacks can disrupt even strong links between
very low duty-cycle sensor nodes to great effect.
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